Preface
In light of deteriorating defense budgets, funding to develop and procure replacement weapons systems becomes increasingly uncertain. The problem often stems from the lack of alternatives to replace obsolete systems. Sometimes the mission is delegated to other resources: for example, satellites now perform many tasks that the SR-71 used to accomplish. In other cases, where national security strategy dictates, the mission diminishes or disappears altogether: for instance, the end of the Cold War enabled all U.S. military services to significantly reduce nuclear arsenals and their delivery platforms.
There are other illustrations where alternatives present themselves to supplant decaying weapons systems, but in the case of the C-141 strategic airlifter this is not so.
The C-17 is the appropriate alternative to meet America's future airlift requirements.
But we must acquire it in sufficient numbers to meet our needs. Too often we take the inappropriate course on a journey where the way is clear. This is turning out to be true with the C-17. Unfortunately our neglect of facts and blindness in foresight with regard to the strategic airlift force will have a high price for America in years to come. I genuinely hope that reports such as this continue to highlight our need to fiscally budget for a robust airlift fleet that will meet the country's future peacetime and contingency requirements.
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Abstract
The United States Air Force requires a core airlifter to accomplish national military objectives. The current aircraft that fills this role, the aging C-141 Starlifter, is being replaced by the C-17 Globemaster III. The success of this new airlifter depends not only on its inherent capabilities, but also on the size of the fleet. Determining the "right" size rests on our ability to forecast future requirements and tailor our airlift assets to meet established objectives.
Current studies and recent contingencies indicate that strategic airlift force structure will be unable to meet our present national security strategy and national military objectives. This report analyzes the ability of our current and future airlift forces to project and sustain U.S. power abroad. To this end, the focus of the research is in three resource planning areas: 1) present and future requirements; 2) current capabilities; and 3) airframe attrition.
In the requirements discussion, the analysis highlights the underestimation of airlift needed to deploy and sustain U.S. forces in major regional conflicts around the world. The capabilities section examines airlift to the extent to which current and future fleets meet projected requirements. Finally, the last segment emphasizes the need to account for airframe attrition when using resource planning models.
viii The findings from this research project indicate that Air Mobility Command, although seriously concerned about deficient core airlift capabilities, will not have the ability to meet future taskings posed by major regional conflicts.
-General Robert L. Rutherford

Introduction and Problem Definition
Worldwide mobility for U.S. military forces is a fundamental precept in our national security strategy of "engagement and enlargement." 2 Core strategic airlift provides the country's uniformed services with crucial mobility, and yet this capability is jeopardized by C-17 shortfalls looming on the horizon. Strategic lift, in the interests of "enhancing our security," is implied within the framework of the current administration's national security strategy document.
To protect and advance U.S. interests in the face of the dangers and opportunities outlined earlier, the United States must employ robust and flexible military forces that can accomplish a variety of tasks:
Deterring and defeating aggression in major regional conflicts. Our forces must be able to help offset the military power of regional states with interests opposed to those of the United States and its allies. To do this, we must be able to credibly deter and defeat aggression by projecting and sustaining U.S. power in more than one region if necessary.
Today, the ability to meet the operational objectives of power projection and force sustainment from the continental United States is the heart of the issue. Because of this, air mobility in the post-Cold War global environment is emerging as a crucial element in promoting the U.S. national strategy of engagement and enlargement. "National security strategy depends on decisive air mobility forces to protect America's vital global interests." 4 As our nation moves away from forward overseas basing, we face the rapid mobility demands that a CONUS-based, expeditionary military force presents. To that end, airlift delivers the majority of the initial time-critical forces and war materiel to regional hot spots in support of expeditionary operations. To meet these strategic needs, the United States armed forces rely on a core airlifter to accomplish both peacetime and contingency taskings. Unified commanders and Air Mobility Command (AMC) demand that this airlifter be reliable and operate throughout the range of military environments --herein lies the problem.
Air Mobility Command's current core airlifter, the C-141B Starlifter, can no longer meet operational requirements and therefore limits the National Command Authority's options in peacetime and contingency scenarios. 5 Although the fleet of C-141s recently went through major repairs, its future viability in strategic airlift is questionable.
"Problems such as the weep holes on the lower surface of the wing show the age and deterioration of this well used aircraft. As the aircraft continues to age, it is quite possible new structural problems may limit the readiness of the force…Additionally, the process of retiring high flight hour equivalent aircraft will culminate with the retirement of the entire AMC active duty fleet by FY03." 6 A follow-on airlifter acquired in sufficient numbers to replace the aging C-141 fleet is therefore vital to implementing national security strategy and meeting U.S. mobility objectives.
Thesis Statement
Procuring only 120 C-17 Globemaster III aircraft to replace the C-141 fleet will not meet U.S. wartime requirements for core strategic airlift. Although the C-17 is now exceeding design expectations, the fleet will not provide enough volume core airlift for the United States in the 21st Century. Fortunately the C-17's ability to meet its strategic airlift specifications, once arguable, is no longer in question. Initially plagued with contractual and design problems, the aircraft is now fully operational at Charleston Air Force Base (AFB), South Carolina. A month-long reliability, maintainability, and availability evaluation (RM&AE) in 1995 tested the aircraft's performance in simulated wartime taskings. The results were exceptional: in 2,252 flying hours and 513 sorties, the C-17 had a 99 percent overall reliability rate and a fully mission capable rate of 84 percent (11.1 percent better than specification). 7 However, even with these encouraging results, the reduced final fleet size of 120 aircraft raises serious speculation about volume lift capability.
Overview
This paper examines the C-17 program in three fundamental areas of airlift planning and operations. The initial focus will explore the airlift requirements for both current and future airlift fleets. Next, in order to meet these requirements, the report shifts toward airlift fleet capabilities with the C-17 as the primary core airlifter. Third, a look at wartime and peacetime operations reveals how lift capability is degraded over the life of the
Strategic Airlift Requirements
Historically 
Resource Planning
In an ideal airlift world, requirements are the driving factor behind force capabilities.
This being the case, the task for airlift planners is twofold: 1) estimate present capabilities and 2) predict future requirements. In the balance lies the ability to meet our national military objectives. The realized difference between these two endeavors equates to airlift surplus, requirements-capability equilibrium, or airlift shortfall. Presently, capability assessments determine our airlift force's ability to meet lift demand (known as force closure) from a finite pool of resources. From these assessments, capabilities-based plans focus on programmed equipment that is currently available or expected to be available at the end of a specified planning period. 3 Although this is a valid approach to resource planning, strategic airlift requirements must also be examined since users within DOD pose demands on airlift resources for mobility needs.
On the "pull" end, requirements studies estimate the assets needed to meet a given force closure. Specific focus on strategic airlift requirement issues is AMC's responsibility, but U.S. Transportation Command's (USTRANSCOM) overseeing part as a unified command plays an integral role in determining needs as well. Requirements studies produce valuable insights by incorporating both historical sources and current data/trends to estimate present and future demands on strategic airlift. Because of their value, resource planning and requirements studies have guided us over the past two decades.
Requirements Studies
Congressional interest in U.S. strategic mobility requirements led to three separate studies on the subject in the last 15 years. These analyses attempted to shed light on possible shortfalls within the airlift, sealift, and prepositioning triad for our national This tentative, yet alarming estimate, was one impetus for initiating the C-17 program.
A second study, the Revised Intertheater Mobility Study (RIMS) followed the CMMS, focused on a Middle East global war scenario, but it made overly optimistic assumptions with regard to infrastructure and host nation support. 6 Although this analysis revealed shortfalls, DOD didn't approve the results and its impact was minimal. timeframe-approximately 100,000 tons of cargo in a 7-day period. To put this into perspective from an airframe utilization standpoint, it takes 400 C-5 sorties and 1200 C-141 sorties to move one Army division. 12 Using the airlift planning factors chart (see Table 1 ) from the Air Mobility Master Plan, we can project the number of sorties this equates to for a future fleet of C-5s and C-17s-400 and 600 sorties, respectively.
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Given a fleet of 120 C-17s, of which 110 will be in operational squadrons, that is over five roundtrips from CONUS bases to move that division. Keep in mind, that's for one division and does not include moving any other warfighting resources. Beyond these studies, the Gulf War provides a real world example of our ability to deploy and sustain forces in an MRC. Desert Shield/Desert Storm did indeed test our air mobility assets, but there were factors that masked significant shortfalls within the system. The bottom line in the aforementioned studies and the Gulf War is that it is very difficult to develop concrete data on projected requirements for contingency scenarios.
Logistics are substantially affected by the Clausewitzian fog and friction that surrounds war. To counter the effects of unpredictable logistical problems, airlift planners and forecasters must be conservative in their estimates of wartime strategic requirements.
With this in mind and given the 49.7 MTM/D established by MRS/BURU as our baseline airlift capability, the current target force structure may be unrealistically low in relation to actual needs-essentially invalidating the C-17 airlift fleet that is being tailored to meet this mathematically generated figure.
Unfortunately, until a more conservative requirements analysis supersedes MRS/BURU, the 49.7 MTM/D requisite stands as our objective airlift demand. Chapter 3 will examine this requirement in terms of current and projected capabilities. 
Notes
Strategic Airlift Capabilities
Force Restructuring
America's strategic airlift capability today is in a state of transition due to shifting to accomplish the tasks that are unique to their capabilities.
In this time of transition, and beyond, the tanker force will carry on this secondary role of strategic airlift. Given its short track record in airlift, it is essential that we continue to look for efficient ways to incorporate it into logistical operations.
Additionally, as Figure 2 shows the KC-135 beginning to reach its service life in 2012, AMC must view its replacement not only from an air refueling perspective but from an airlift perspective as well. The KC-X will undoubtedly be more of a hybrid like the KC-10, and it may also have many of the C-17's capabilities. Some configurations may even allow the C-17 to operate in this role, thereby realizing the strongest traits of both tanker and airlifter. Although the addition of tankers to supplement the strategic airlift force is an important consideration, a new core airlifter was still required to fulfill both volume and mission-specific requirements.
Core Airlift
Successful U.S. power projection lies in our ability to field a modern strategic airlift fleet, sufficient in both numbers and capability. This fleet must have adequate capacity, range, and versatility to meet the broad spectrum of military requirements. Per the Air Mobility Master Plan, Figure 3 depicts current and projected U.S. strategic airlift forces.
Here, the 109 operational C-5s are a given in the equation as their service life carries the weapons system well into the next century. 4 The problematic variable thus becomes the C-141 as it retires, followed up by the C-17 to replace it. How do we meet the requirements driven by a near-simultaneous two MRC scenario? What final production numbers are we looking at for the C-17, and what should the force mix be until all those new aircraft are operational? This is where requirements and capabilities meet the road, and tabulating the numbers takes the best airlift planners to decide an appropriate mix for meeting our national military objectives.
Figure 3. Strategic Airlift Force Structure
The problem Air Mobility Command planners face is not with the capability of the new core airlifter, but instead with the relatively small number of operational C-17s that will replace the C-141s. Currently 242 C-141s provide the core capability for AMC's strategic airlift fleet. 5 In the late 1980s, initial plans for operational C-17s called for 210 aircraft to be completed by 1998 to replace the C-141 fleet. Representative Office, believed the development and production problems were rooted within Douglas management. "Since Douglas has chosen to inadequately budget the contract, cost and schedule have constantly grown and will continue to do so.
Furthermore, cost problems should be expected to increase at a greater rate. Postponed work becomes more expensive and takes longer. The rule of thumb is that the impact is exponential rather than linear." 7 Further examination in the same hearings from the General Accounting Office (GAO) conversely indicated that the problem was two-sided in the developmental and production process. Both the Air Force's and Douglas' official cost and schedule estimates were consistently optimistic based on declining cost performance trends, test problems, and slips to the test flight schedule. 8 Unfortunately, because of these undefinitized contract agreements, confining aircraft specifications, and production delays, Congress and the USAF did not fund the needed 210 airframes due to resulting cost overruns and shrinking defense budgets.
Airlift Dilemma
The resulting contract for 120 C-17s to replace the C-141 fleet is slightly more than half the original 210-aircraft requirement deemed necessary to meet both present and future strategic lift requirements. "In the Pentagon's 1992 Mobility Requirements Study, when the plan was to still have 120 C-17s in the FY99 fleet, the USAF identified a 'moderate risk' in its ability to deliver combat units as required to the first major regional conflict, running about two weeks behind by day 30." 9 A less optimistic, but perhaps more accurate term for "moderate risk" is shortfall. Beyond that, the study also forecasted that there would be a significant decline, about 5 MTM/D, in total airlift capacity as the C-141s retire. In order to retain that airlift capability, the study recommended that the DOD needed to extend the C-17 program by 34 aircraft or find a suitable airlift alternative. 10 AMC's move to employ KC-10s, KC-135s and contract carriers as a stopgap measure to reverse the declining core capacity means U.S. strategic airlift capability will suffer and be unable to meet future contingency requirements. shortfall. Cumulative shortfall is only part of the problem, however.
Our inability to meet peak demands along the deployment timeline presents a significant deficiency in moving volume at crucial times in the contingency. The capability lines ("Today's" and "Future" fleets) are linear because these represent a fixed number of airframes operating at wartime surge rates. In other words, that is all our assets giving as much as they can give. These airlift resources are able to move approximately 60,000 tons every 20 days throughout a contingency. However, the peak demands at 15-21 days and 60-70 days find both our current and future fleets woefully short in lift capability.
Figure 4. Cargo Closure Requirement versus Capability
Further analysis of this graph shows the inability of current airlift to provide cumulative tons required by theater commanders until the 170-day point of the timeline.
Additionally, although our projected fleet fairs better, capability still shows a lag in tons delivered until the 100-day point. This can be attributed to playing "catch-up" from the peak demand periods. Although our capability to meet demand during non-peak times is adequate, the overall capability to meet requirements is lacking. To make the ramifications of this graph clear in a hypothetical sense, Desert Storm provides an interesting example.
The Gulf War: A Case Study
The airlift of war materiel to the Persian Gulf was the largest of its kind in history, and as indicated earlier, it provides some valuable lessons. 
Unrealistic Modeling
Deploying and sustaining U.S. forces to a major regional conflict is a difficult proposition in the best of circumstances. Our ability to accomplish this mission in demanding conditions during the Gulf War put a severe strain on all of our airlift resources. In light of the extreme environments in which our aircraft and aircrews operated, Military Airlift Command was fortunate to lose only one strategic airlifter-a C-5 that crashed after takeoff at Ramstein Airbase, Germany. For contingency operations, Desert Shield/Desert Storm appears to be an anomaly that could lull planners into a false sense of infallibility. Peacetime and wartime attrition of strategic airlift assets is a reality that incrementally degrades our overall ability to project and sustain U.S. presence abroad.
As such, it presents a seemingly overlooked "friction" force that must be factored into future scenarios. This chapter focuses attention on this aspect of air mobility and how it could affect power projection and force sustainability. A shortcoming we perceive with current models is that they all assume everything is known with certainty, though of course wartime will be characterized by numerous uncertainties. During wartime, analysts cannot be sure of the quantities of equipment and personnel that units actually possess, the availability and performance of transportation assets, or the availability and capability of airfields and ports. Also, enemy actions or political situations may give rise to events that are unanticipated during peacetime planning. A theater commander's plans and tactics may therefore change, resulting in changes to deployment plans. 2 The concern this finding generates is clear, and at the same time alarming, when discussing contingency airlift. The Air Mobility Master Plan indicates that the core airlifter must be "survivable in a low threat environment on a routine basis." 3 However, transport aircraft are very vulnerable to attack due to their size, maneuverability and lack of self-protective offensive and defensive equipment. Operating in low threat environments on a "routine basis," regardless of countermeasures, increases the risk of attrition. To that end, beyond developing tactics for threat avoidance and degradation, little has been done to increase the survivability of airlift assets. Initial efforts with the Snow Storm program to retrofit three C-141s and two C-5s with IR defensive capability could hardly be called a comprehensive solution. 4 A similar band-aid approach is underway for the C-17. Currently, only 5 of the 33 operational C-17s have missile warning systems and associated automatic flare dispensers. environments.
An even greater risk to the strategic airlift force, specifically the C-17, is present in unlimited war. However, loss estimates for these scenarios are speculative at best. The
Rand study did not venture to say how to reach approximate values, only that they should be figured into strategic airlift models. 6 Indeed one estimate found that up to one-third of our strategic aircraft may be lost during the first 180 days of combat. 7 The point is not so much the number itself, but rather the idea that we cannot ignore that losses will occur. If we plan to use the C-17 in combat, then we must factor in attrition. Former CINC/TRANSCOM General Robert L. Rutherford reinforced the aircraft's susceptibility when he said, "We will use the C-17 in a combat situation if we are required to…I'm not going to say that that's its primary role, but it's one more thing that we've got the capability to do." 
"Robust Solutions"
Even if strategic assets are not operating in high or medium threat areas, they will still suffer attrition. The RAND study reveals a planning guide to focus our attention in this area: "We believe that mobility models should produce robust solutions, or at least help the analyst to understand the range of scenarios and assumptions for which a solution 'works.' What must be avoided are transportation force structures that are optimal for only one or a few wartime scenarios and sets of events, but fall apart quickly if actual events deviate from that narrow set of events."
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One clear way to obtain "robust solutions" is to have depth in assets-more airlift. The second way to enhance your options is to have greater capabilities within the assets that you do have-versatile airlift.
The C-17 already does this with its increased payload, longer range, enhanced performance, and advanced technology over the older C-141. It is the number of assets that presents the problem. Although we attribute attrition mainly to wartime operations, peacetime losses degrade airlift capability just the same.
The C-17 is a new aircraft with a 30,000-hour service life expectancy. force deployment data also shows that our requirements supersede current and future capabilities. The need to meet timeline requirements and handle peak demands within deployment and sustainment operations is clearly a problem to theater commanders.
Neither core airlift nor shock absorbing measures will alleviate the problems posed by the time-phased deployment. A likely alternative to minimize airlift requirements and peak demand is to reduce overall airlift deployment/sustainment operations through the use of fast sealift or prepositioning.
With the final analysis from SAFMA and the Tactical Unit Analysis in process, AMC must adjust the Air Mobility Master Plan to reflect these new studies. In all likelihood, these assessments will reveal increased requirements for future strategic airlift.
Additionally, the military services quadrennial review in 1997 will probably impact overseas drawdown in an adverse manner, thereby increasing airlift deployment requirements of CONUS-based forces. The Air Force and AMC must be ready for these events and continue to address strategic lift requirements as contextual elements evolve in the post-Cold War environment.
Capabilities
U.S. strategic airlift forces are modernizing to meet the challenges of today and tomorrow. The C-17 is the crucial link from old to new technologies and capabilities.
Despite initial growing pains with the aircraft, it is now performing up to and exceeding many specifications. The problem, however, lies in the final production number needed to meet national military requirements. With DOD production capped at 120 C-17s, recent mobility studies indicate that this will fall short in reaching our strategic airlift objectives.
The problem when examining this final production number is not merely the number itself, but how it was arrived at. A final C-17 fleet size of 120 is not requirement-based.
Instead, it focuses more predominantly on fiscal budgets than actual contingency need.
Military leadership knows this, but unfortunately the civilian leadership that determines fiscal budgets is willing to assume the risk of degraded capability. This raises the question that many senior military leaders have posed recently, "What good are forces if we don't have the lift to get them there?"
Two solutions present themselves as we assume a "capabilities-based" force structure.
First, as this force evolves within fiscally-constrained defense budgets, matching requirements with fixed capabilities demands reducing military taskings presented by an over-extended national security strategy. The current administration's statement that "We must be able to credibly deter and defeat aggression by projecting and sustaining U.S.
power in more than one region," is an invalid one with the shortfall in strategic airlift that 120 C-17s presents. 1 The budget decision to build only 120 C-17s is inconsistent with our national security strategy and should be changed to establish policy congruence. This could very well mean abandoning the two near-simultaneous MRC scenario in favor of a less ambitious national security strategy. On the other hand, if we want to keep capabilities in line with strategy then the Mobility Requirements Study recommends the purchase of at least 34 more C-17s to bolster capability. 2 Although this is fiscally more precarious, it is operationally sound regarding current national policy.
The second option that shows promise from a capabilities standpoint is the move toward multilateral efforts in dealing with the spectrum of security threats. Although this should not absolve us of maintaining unilateral capability, it does enhance our collective capability without putting fiscal burdens exclusively on our shoulders. Both of these approaches could go a long way toward reducing U.S. organic lift requirements (by reducing overall military requirements) and bringing them more in line with strategic capabilities. Paramount to credibility and deterring threats in the international community is making our "bark consistent with our bite" when it comes to policy and strategic capabilities.
Attrition
Current strategic airlift models do not account for aircraft attrition. Given the hostile environments the C-17 will be operating in, this fact invalidates these models. Therefore, attrition cannot be ignored if we are to reasonably predict future capability versus demand.
Presently, there are no clear ways to predict wartime losses beyond studying historical attrition rates of transport aircraft. Even these may not provide applicable data given the proliferation of lethal shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles in recent years. Likewise in peacetime, aircraft attrition due to operational and training mishaps will degrade the C-17 fleet. These contingency and peacetime losses are especially significant in a downsized force.
As the strategic airlift force downsizes, each individual asset's value within the force multiplies. The age old question of "large fleet size of moderately capable aircraft (C141s) versus a smaller fleet size of very highly capable aircraft (C-17)" bears consideration. For example, losing one aircraft from a total of 120 C-17s is four times as debilitating to the force as losing one C-141 from a fleet of 242 aircraft-with the C-17's capability twice that of the C-141. The resulting dilemma thus becomes one of utilizing the C-17 to fulfill a mission and risk losing it or not using it to conserve the asset and thereby not satisfying mission requirements. The bottom line is that there should not have to be compromise. Curtailing the C-17 fleet that provides core airlift capability for the nation infringes upon a basic tenet of aerospace power-flexibility. Given our recent
